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Recently Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux have attacked the core 
of the phenomenological hermeneutic tradition: its commitment to the 
finitude of human understanding.  If accurate, this critique threatens to 
render the whole tradition a topic of merely historical interest.  Given 
the depth of the criticism, this essay aims to establish a provisional de-
fense of hermeneutics.  After briefly reviewing each critique, it is ar-
gued that Badiou and Meillassoux themselves face rather intractable 
difficulties. These difficulties, then, open the space for a hermeneutic 
response, which is accomplished largely by drawing on the work of 
Paul Ricoeur. We close with a suggested program for hermeneutic 
thought.  
 
1. 
 
Phenomenological hermeneutics is in a state of crisis. While there have 
always been detractors of this program, the recent criticisms by Alain 
Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux have cut to the heart of the project: hu-
man understanding (Verstehen) is finite.  Badiou captures the animating 
sentiment of the critique when he states that the central aim of philoso-
phy today is “to finish up with the motif of finitude and its hermeneutical 
escort.”1 Their position, however, is not the symmetrically opposite 
claim that human understanding is, instead, infinite.  Rather, they argue 
that advances in mathematics long overlooked by philosophers have ir-
revocably changed the relation of the finite to the infinite, so that the cur-
rent account of hermeneutics as a finite endeavour necessarily perpetu-
ates the metaphysics of presence.  In light of these critiques of phenome-
nological and hermeneutic philosophy, the aim of this essay is to provide 
a provisional hermeneutic response. For unless such a task is undertaken, 
it seems likely that our program of thought will be of little more than his-
torical interest. 
                                                  
1 Alain Badiou, Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontol-
ogy, (tr.) Norman Madarasz (Albany: State University of New York, 2006), 30. 
Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as ST. 
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 The steps to such a response are straightforward.  First, we shall 
be required to review precisely what these criticisms are in a brief, 
though not superficial way.  A key point here is that Badiou’s criticism 
of hermeneutics is in need of some rectification for it to hit its mark.  
Second, and this point is crucial for establishing the relative merit of 
hermeneutic thought, we argue that these alternative projects simply have 
not made the advances claimed.  Since Meillassoux’s short treatise is 
openly an unfinished project, we focus principally on Badiou’s dialecti-
cal materialism, a position that has matured over nearly two decades. Our 
points here will address the unwarranted reductionism entailed in both 
projects.  Finally, we argue that hermeneutics need not fall to the critique 
of finitude.  Our principal resource in this response is the work of Paul 
Ricoeur, though some borrowing will be made from other extensions.  
To be clear, these responses are not meant to suggest that nothing can be 
learned from Badiou and Meillassoux.  The case is quite the opposite.  
Their value to philosophy is precisely in presenting new challenges, new 
models and new avenues for thought.  Indeed, we shall see that, in order 
to fully meet these challenges, hermeneutic philosophers will almost cer-
tainly have to change the way they practise, or at least their shared 
framework of finitude.  What is finally denied, then, are the sweeping 
claims that have made a straw man out of the hermeneutic position.  
What is affirmed is a new program for philosophy. 
 
2. 
 
Badiou and Meillassoux, though joined in their distaste of finitude, each 
present a separate critique of phenomenological-hermeneutics.  Because 
Badiou’s argument is more complicated, and in need of some rectifica-
tion, we shall, for simplicity’s sake, begin with Meillassoux’s ancestral 
argument.  
 Meillassoux’s little book After Finitude: An Essay of the Neces-
sity of Contingency aims at awakening contemporary philosophers.  “If 
Hume’s problem woke Kant from his dogmatic slumber,” he writes, “we 
can only hope that the problem of ancestrality succeeds in waking us 
from our correlationist slumber, by enjoining us to reconcile thought and 
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the absolute.”2 “Correlationism,” we learn, describes phenomenologists, 
hermeneutic philosophers, even ordinary language philosophers.  The 
definition for a correlationist is as follows: 
 
S is a correlationist iff S holds that thought and what is (e.g. being, real-
ity, language, the phenomenal, etc.) are correlative.   
 
The two dominant versions of this correlationism in the 20th century have 
been consciousness, exemplified by the phenomenological hermeneutic 
tradition, and language, typical of Anglo-American philosophy.  The 
former holds that what is, or what appears, is only insofar it appears in 
consciousness.  Heidegger adopts a similar view, since “the ‘co-
propriation’ which constitutes Ereignis means that neither being nor man 
can be posited as subsisting ‘in-themselves,’ and subsequently entering 
into relation—on the contrary, both terms of the appropriation are origi-
nally constituted through their reciprocal relation: ‘The appropriation ap-
propriates man and Being to their essential togetherness.’” (AF, 8) He 
argues that the limits of language are the limits of what can be known or 
thought intelligently. 
 There is an immediate consequence to the correlationist com-
mitment, which one may state alternatively as the inability to think the 
absolute or the finitude of thought.  Because correlationists are commit-
ted to the notion that it would be self-contradictory to claim there is some 
absolute, in-itself, without relation to thought (even to state it, am I not 
thinking of it?), objectivity must be redefined as universalisable repre-
sentation. (AF, 4)  This reformulation states clearly one’s inability to 
think the absolute as, for example, in Descartes’ discussion of primary 
qualities.3  The finitude of thought, then, consists in the positive 
reformulation of this inability.  It is, in brief, the paradoxical status 
whereby one is directly introduced to the things themselves, since there 
                                                  
2 Meillassoux, Quentin, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contin-
gency, (tr.) Ray Brassier (New York: Continuum Press, 2008), 128. Hereafter re-
ferred to parenthetically in the text as AF. 
3 One must note here that I am glossing over the distinction Meillassoux draws 
between Kant’s weak correlationism, which still maintained that the absolute (= 
noumenal) could be thought negatively by the principle of non-contradiction, 
and strong correlationism, which holds that even this is only a law of my thought 
(e.g., as Heidegger holds). 
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is nothing behind the appearances (=transcendence), but equally trapped 
by them, since we cannot think of anything beyond them (=immanence). 
(AF, 7)  Such enabling/disabling, then, characterises the truth (a-lētheia) 
of finitude. 
 The critique of finitude, then, can be posed as a question.  Given 
the existence of some item that predates human existence, such as a fos-
sil, what is the meaning of a scientist’s statements about it?  Since Meil-
lassoux defines an “ancestral” as “any reality anterior to the emergence 
of the human species,” one could rephrase this question by asking, how 
is one to make sense of an ancestral statement? (AF, 10)  Take, for ex-
ample, a “naïve” scientific statement of the following type: 
 
Statement A: “Event x occurred y million years before the emergence of 
humans.” 
 
For the correlationist, this question proves unanswerable in any way that 
does not precisely violate its meaning.  Since the correlationist holds that 
everything is thought in relation to some human correlate, he is commit-
ted to redescribing the scientist’s “naïve” literal statement as follows:  
 
Statement A´: “Event x occurred y million years before the emergence of 
humans for us.” 
 
Such a redescription, however, is patently absurd, since it flatly denies 
the meaning of the scientific claim.  The inability of the correlationists to 
countenance the literal meaning of such scientific claims is the ancestral 
problem. 
 Such an argument is quite powerful, since it would seem that 
only those who are prepared to deny any legitimacy to scientific claims, 
such as Biblical literalists who believe the Earth to be only 6,000 years 
old, could accept that the required redescription is not a problem.  The 
ancestral problem, then, is supposed to force correlationists to recognise 
the need to admit that thought can reach the absolute, which is precisely 
what correlationism forecloses.  To meet the problem, then, one must 
show that one can think the absolute in some way.  More specifically, 
this requires that one be able to make sense of scientific claims about his-
torical matters, such as fossils. 
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3. 
 
We turn now to Badiou’s more complex argument against phenomenol-
ogical-hermeneutics, and would like to note two items straight away.  
First, one aspect of his general criticism of “democratic materialism” is 
quite similar to Meillassoux’s correlationism, so Badiou has recently de-
cided simply to take up Meillassoux’s criticism as his own.4 (LW, 119)  
Second, Badiou has an additional argument, which he has been develop-
ing since Theory of the Subject, that focusses specifically on the Heideg-
gerian legacy of the finitude of thought.5  Positively, what he opposes to 
this position is what he calls the “Cantorian Revolution.”6 Negatively, he 
proposes what we shall here call the ghostly presence argument. Stated 
as plainly as possible, it is as follows: 
 
Phenomenological hermeneutics is committed to thinking the meaning of 
being without presence.  This school of thought is also committed to the 
position that understanding (Verstehen) is finite.  It is this latter commit-
ment that prevents the achievement of the former, since any such limit or 
horizon of understanding is itself a ghostly presence.7 
 
The conclusion of the ghostly presence argument, then, turns on the abil-
ity to show that a commitment to the finitude of understanding, or of the 
meaning of Being (Sein), is itself some form of presence.  How can 
Badiou make this claim? 
 The answer, we believe, comes in two parts.  First, we must 
grasp how a limit can be understood as a commitment to original pres-
                                                  
4 Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds, (tr.) Alberto Toscano (New York: Continuum 
Press, 2009), 119. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as LW. 
5 See, in particular, Badiou’s February 6th lecture “Neighborhoods,” in Theory of 
the Subject, (tr.) Bruno Bosteels (New York: Continuum Press, 2009). 
6 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, (tr.) Oliver Feltham (New York: Continuum 
Press, 2005), 273. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as BE. 
7 Badiou explicitly states that constraining being by a limit reinstates the power 
of the One, or the metaphysics of presence as follows: “We have to assume, as 
did Lucretius, that manifold-unfolding [=being as pure multiplicity] is not con-
strained by the immanence of a limit.  For it is only too obvious that such a con-
straint proves the power of the One as grounding the multiple itself.” See his 
Briefings on Existence, 35–36.  
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ence.  Badiou’s point is straightforward: Heidegger himself claims that 
ontotheology takes beings as an original unity. In the second volume of 
his Nietzsche, Heidegger states the following: “[T]he preeminence of be-
ings secures Being as koinon (common) from the perspective of the en 
[sic] (One).  The distinctive character of metaphysics has been decided.  
The One as unifying unity becomes normative for the subsequent deter-
mination of Being.” (ST, 34)8  To escape the history of metaphysics, 
then, it is necessary to think the meaning of Being free from such unity, 
whether conceived metaphysically (so that substances are primary uni-
ties), transcendentally (so that the “I think” is the final unity), or idealis-
tically (so that the Absolute is the final unity).  If verstehen, or the mean-
ing of Sein, then, has some final horizon or limit that sets the parameters 
of beings, then it is clear that one has here an original grounding unity.  
Thus, thinkers who believe that the peril of thought occurs at the limit, 
threshold or verge, are at best ghostly ontotheologians.  While Badiou 
has various names for this position, we shall call such partisans liminal 
thinkers.9 
 The second part concerns the criterion for determining that one 
does not remain committed to finitude.  Liminal thinking defines life only 
in terms of death, good in terms of evil.  One could say “that the term 
common to phenomenology and vitalism—to Husserl and Bergson, Sar-
tre and Deleuze—is death, as attestation of finite existence, which is 
simply a modality of an infinite over-existence, or of a power of the One 
which we only experience through its reverse.” (LW, 268)  The One as 
limit regulates life by death.  For Badiou, by contrast, living is “an incor-
poration into the present under the faithful form of a subject.” (LW, 508)  
At a mathematical level, Badiou notes, there is nothing interesting about 
                                                  
8 I have quoted from Madarasz’ translation rather than David Farrell Krell’s for 
the translation of Heidegger’s Nietzsche, since Badiou’s point is somewhat lost 
in the standard formulation.  For a similar point elsewhere in Heidegger’s cor-
pus, see Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, (tr.) Parvis Emad and 
Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 145–48. 
9 We have simply invented a term since Badiou has often changed the names, 
with only very slight modifications in meaning, as he developed his own posi-
tion.  Thus, for example, in Being and Event, he speaks of “ontologies of Pres-
ence” (451), while in Briefings on Existence, he speaks of “Romanticism” (28), 
and finally, in Logics of Worlds, he refers to “democratic materialism” (1). 
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a limit.10  What presents the peril of thought is the wager, the evental 
declaration that sounds an impossible trace within a world. (BE, 451)11  
Yet the wager itself is easy.  It is the fidelity, the commitment to see the 
event through, that is most difficult.12  Yet philosophies of finitude can-
not grasp this notion; in fact, they must deny it.  Thus, the deepest truth 
of liminal thinking is nothing other than nihilism.  It paralyses thought 
when it claims that approaching a limit is profound, rather than remain-
ing faithful to an event, since any project for intervention is stigmatised 
as a utopian nightmare.13  The criterion for a post-Cantorian infinite phi-
losophy, then, is that it recognises that it is only with a positive prescrip-
tion and subsequent intervention that one has encountered what is most 
profound in thought.   
 Here, a Heideggerian response is not difficult to fathom.14  Hei-
degger’s account of the finitude of Being is not as a unity, but as a proc-
                                                  
10 We do not mean by this that there is nothing interesting about finite mathe-
matics, but only that there is nothing about finite mathematics that would pre-
sent one with the “peril of thought,” which is to say thought’s most profound 
point.  This point holds especially set-theoretically, which is Badiou’s concern, 
since the finite is defined in terms of the infinite. See Being and Event, 159. 
11 It is unfortunate that Badiou reserves the reasoning for this point for the third 
appendix of Being and Event. Though one finds similar statements scattered 
throughout his corpus, including, crucially, in the first two chapters of Briefings 
on Existence and in his essay “Philosophy and Mathematics” in Conditions, (tr.) 
Steven Corcoran (New York: Continuum Press, 2008). Hereafter referred to par-
enthetically in the text as C. 
12 In the later Logics of Worlds, it is especially this point which concerns the ap-
pearance of consequences that distinguishes between an event proper and a 
weak singularity. See p. 374. 
13 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, (tr.) Peter Hall-
ward (New York: Verso Publishing, 2001), 13.  This last point, clearly, is made 
in the context of Badiou’s polemic against what passes for “ethics,” but it is of a 
piece with the nihilism that he sees at the heart of liminal thinking. 
14 The interested reader can find these points spelled out in Leonard Lawlor’s es-
say “Verendlichung (Finitization): The Overcoming of Metaphysics with Life,” 
Philosophy Today [vol. and or n. available?] (Winter 2004), 399–412.  For a 
similar account addressing the later Heidegger, see John Sallis, Echoes: After 
Heidegger (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), ch. 
1. 
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ess. It is Verendlichung, or finitizing, which is more like Badiou’s count-
for-one than an original unity.  In trying to think Ereignis as the structur-
ing of this finitizing process, then, are not Badiou and Heidegger com-
mitted to the same project?  Furthermore, if Heidegger does not address 
evental intervention, this is because Ereignis is more fundamental than 
what Badiou addresses, namely mathematics.  We find, then, that Badiou 
fails to grasp the depth of Heidegger’s thought. 
 With this response, we see the fundamental way in which 
Badiou’s criticism fails.  Taken without modification, Badiou at best op-
poses his penchant for mathematics to Heidegger’s love of poetry.  To 
rectify Badiou’s position, it is necessary to construct a lemma for the 
ghostly presence argument, which we shall call the derivative argument.  
It is as follows: In order to establish that something is derivative, one 
must show both the priority of that which establishes the derivable (a 
move down), and how the phenomena are derived from it (a move up).  
Yet, Heidegger’s claim to the priority of the meaning of Being never ac-
complished the return route.  Thus, he must either abandon his position, 
or establish the derivation, or undertake a long hermeneutic road with 
other sciences.  The first option is tantamount to failure, and the second 
was never accomplished.15  Yet, in taking the third option, it is necessary 
to dialogue with such disciplines as mathematics, and here it becomes 
clear that Heidegger fails to meet the criterion of infinite thought: he has 
not thought evental intervention, and so remains a ghostly thinker of 
presence. One is required, then, to take up the Cantorian Revolution and 
join the task of infinite thought, or remain committed to the metaphysics 
of presence.  In either case, phenomenological hermeneutics is no longer 
a viable option for philosophers. 
 
4. 
 
Before turning to a defence of hermeneutics, we would like to point out 
that Badiou and Meillassoux’s positions are not themselves without 
flaws. First, we note that Meillassoux’s restriction of the absolute to what 
can be thought mathematically is simply a non-starter. (AF, 3)  What is 
                                                  
15 We note that John Sallis does provide tentative grounds for Heidegger’s “re-
turn route” in the very late Zähringen seminars in Echoes, 38–43.  Still, even he 
argues that the route was never fully accomplished. 
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one to make of the status of logic?  Surely, mathematics cannot even be-
gin as a discipline without it, and yet, its results are profoundly altered by 
logic. To take just one example, if one accepts the existence of dialethe-
ias, or true contradictions, it is possible to prove the completeness of 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.16  Furthermore, what is the status of the sci-
ences?  Even physics admits of an experimental procedure that breaks 
cleanly with mathematical deduction.  And even if one could somehow 
avoid this obvious difference, it appears that Meillassoux would be 
committed to an absurd reductionism of sciences such as biology to 
mathematics, the likes of which not even the logical positivists held.  
This same point, we note, holds for Badiou’s treatment of “scientific sub-
jects,” by which he intends to include all kinds of logical, mathematical 
and scientific operations. (LW, 74) 
 A likely response here is that Meillassoux does not hold that 
mathematics, in the strict disciplinary sense, is what grants one access to 
the absolute, but mathematics in a broad sense.  He is quite clear, for ex-
ample, that he takes mathematics to include mathematical data and 
measurements. (AF, 11)  Badiou’s position is similar.  He states, for ex-
ample, that by “mathematisable” he means “submitted to the literal 
power of inferences.” (LW, 74)  He then spells out just what he means by 
inference through the category-theoretic notion of dependence. (LW, 
171) 
 Yet the objection remains.  Measurement plus mathematical ar-
gument hardly covers the operations of scientific inquiry, and neither is 
Badiou’s treatment of dependence adequate.  While his notion is cer-
tainly more robust, he has yet to express just how logic, mathematics and 
all branches of science are related.  How, precisely, is biology to be 
understood by dependence?  Or would he claim that advances in biology 
and medicine are not science?  Furthermore, how is logic, as a discipline 
in which research mostly consists in non-classical logics, to be accom-
modated in this scheme?  If any non-classical logic were to gain broader 
acceptance, or if logical pluralism were to turn out to be the best hy-
pothesis available, then Badiou would have no way of explaining these 
changes, since his project is premised on their rejection.  While most phi-
losophers of science, mathematics or logic would appeal to criteria such 
as adequacy to the data, non-adhocness, falsifiability or fruitfulness, 
                                                  
16 This conclusion only holds at the cost of consistency, clearly. 
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Badiou has only dependence and consistency. (LW, 487)  Thus, it is no 
overstatement at all to claim that relation of all the enterprises grouped 
under the confused heading of “scientific truth” for Badiou, or “mathe-
matics” for Meillassoux, constitutes a point of weakness for both think-
ers.17  Any position that could explain the relation of these various enter-
prises without reducing them to some sense of mathematics would fare 
better. 
 More problematic for both thinkers, however, is an old objection 
that we should like to call the appearance problem.  It is as follows:  
 
Even if it is possible to reduce phenomena that appear in consciousness 
in the first-person perspective to third-person relations, one must still un-
dertake to reduce them, and this requires understanding what it is one 
wants to reduce.18 
 
In short, by ignoring the first-person perspective, or rather, by treating it 
only as “vulgar phenomenology” or a subjacent example, Badiou and 
Meillassoux have simply failed to meet the burden of proof. (LW, 202)  
Here, the difficulty remains rather intractable, for one must bridge the 
now (in)famous explanatory gap between first-person consciousness and 
third-person relations.  This amounts to demonstrating something such 
as: why blue looks just this way.  Badiou’s recourse to quantitative rela-
tions among the appearance of atoms in Logics of Worlds simply betrays 
the fact that what appears as blue is not in the first place a quantity rela-
tive to a world’s transcendental index.  Even if the relation is preserved, 
the appearance itself is not.  Yet more intractably, one will never be in a 
position to know whether the relation is preserved unless one first under-
stands what the first-person perspective is. Both these reductive prob-
lems, then, pose serious challenges to the materialisms of Badiou and 
                                                  
17 For a similar criticism of Badiou that details the problematic status mathemat-
ics plays in Being and Event with respect to forcing, see Zachary Fraser’s excel-
lent article “The Law of the Subject: Alain Badiou, Luitzen Brouwer and the 
Kripkean Analyses of Forcing and the Heyting Calculus,” in Cosmos and His-
tory: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 2 (2006), 94–133. 
18 This argument, of course, was one of the central points of Thomas Nagel’s 
“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” in Philosophical Review, 83 (1974), 435–50. 
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Meillassoux, and in lieu of any adequate reply, a space opens for a her-
meneutic response. 
 
5. 
 
In turning to a phenomenological-hermeneutic response, we would like 
to note immediately that this school of thought is at least not plagued 
with either of these reductive difficulties.  The explicit use of intentional-
ity, though usually modified from its Husserlian description, clearly 
avoids the appearance problem.  Similarly, while it is not the case that 
hermeneutic philosophers have undertaken to address the philosophy of 
science as fully as they perhaps should, they are at least not committed to 
reductionism.  Without addressing the details, we here note only that 
Don Ihde’s various efforts to extend hermeneutic thought into the sci-
ences and technology demonstrate that phenomenological-hermeneutics 
is able to broach these topics without bald reductionism.19  In these ways, 
then, phenomenological-hermeneutics provides firmer conceptual ground 
to stand on than either Badiou’s or Meillassoux’s respective material-
isms. 
 To make good on these relative advantages, however, we must 
still show that it is possible for hermeneutics to respond to both the an-
cestral problem and the Cantorian Revolution.  To do this, we shall turn 
to Paul Ricoeur’s account of hermeneutics.  We note that a capital advan-
tage of this approach is that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is already in agree-
ment with the derivative argument, since that argument is hardly any-
thing more than a simple modification of Ricoeur’s principal critique of 
Heidegger.20  
 How, then, might Ricoeur be helpful here?  It was noted earlier 
that the mark of a post-Cantorian philosophy enables thought to become 
                                                  
19 Though he continues to develop his understanding of these topics, we direct 
the interested reader especially to Don Ihde’s Postphenomenology: Essays in the 
Post Modern Context (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993) and Ex-
panding Hermeneutics: Visualism in Science (Evanston: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1998) for the most fundamental formulations of his expansion of Ri-
coeur’s hermeneutic model of the text into science. 
20 Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, (tr.) Kathleen 
Blamey and John B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1991), 69.  Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as TA. 
 
 
 
After Hermeneutics?  171 
 
positive through (a) a wager, (b) intervention, and (c) a worldly trans-
formation.  Thus, to avoid the critique of nihilism, we shall have to estab-
lish how Ricoeur’s hermeneutics enables philosophic thought to function 
in a similar way.  Our key argument here is the following: Ricoeur’s ap-
propriation of Jean Nabert’s reflective philosophy allows him to trans-
form the hermeneutic circle into an infinite hermeneutics.  There are two 
intermediary points, or lemmas, that establish this thesis and at the same 
time answer the criticisms of Badiou and Meillassoux respectively.  The 
first lemma: the structural transformation of Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
circle cannot be sustained without an account of wagers, intervention and 
worldly transformation.  This first point, then, makes Ricoeur’s herme-
neutics infinite in the sense required by Badiou.  The second lemma: the 
structural transformation of the hermeneutic circle replaces the correla-
tion between thought and being with the correlation between the question 
and the questioned.  Since this latter correlation enables us to avoid the 
ancestral problem, it responds to Meillassoux’s critique and thus estab-
lishes that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is infinite in his sense of the term.  
Once we have established both of these lemmas, we will legitimately be 
able to claim that Ricoeur does present us with an infinite hermeneutics. 
 
5.1 
 
To begin, then, let us recall in just what way Ricoeur conceives of the 
grafting of hermeneutics onto phenomenology.  It is Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey, he argues, who transform hermeneutics from its regional status 
as a discipline of textual (especially Biblical) scholarship to that of a 
general and epistemological hermeneutics.  Heidegger then takes the 
radical step of displacing this question to the more fundamental domain 
of ontology by the Dasein analytic. (TA, 64)  His move inaugurates what 
Ricoeur famously called the “short route,” to which he opposed his own 
“long route,” which would undertake a detour through symbols and texts 
with the aim of recovering an account of ontology at the end.21 The long 
route is necessary because of the above-noted derivative argument.  One 
consequence of this move is that it is no longer possible to distinguish 
                                                  
21 Paul Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, (ed.) Don Ihde (Evantson: North-
western University Press, 1974), 11. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the 
text as CI. 
 
 
 
172  Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 
 
truth from method.  Another is that the relation of interpretation to tran-
scendental reflection must be reconceived.  It is for this latter task that 
Ricoeur enlists the help of Jean Nabert. 
 In his essay “Nabert on Act and Sign,” Ricoeur argues that Na-
bert’s lasting contribution to the tradition of transcendental reflection is 
to distinguish between a conscious act and its representation in signs.  
Because of this distinction, the interpretation of hermeneutics is not to be 
understood along the Heideggerian lines of explicating (Auslegung) what 
one already pre-comprehends.  Rather, one interprets signs precisely be-
cause one does not have access to one’s conscious acts in any other way. 
(CI, 215)  Human “finitude,” then, cannot be understood as the horizon 
of pre-comprehension, but only as a lack of self-coincidence, which re-
quires that one engage in the task of self-recovery.  Understanding how 
this task, which is just the activity of hermeneutics, is infinite thus estab-
lishes the grounds on which we claim Ricoeur has made the turn to infi-
nite thought.  
 In Ricoeur’s early career, this task was executed through the re-
covery of symbolic meaning.  By a symbol, Ricoeur intends “any struc-
ture of signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning desig-
nates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary and 
figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first.” (CI, 
12–13)  The most detailed account of how this process of symbolic inter-
pretation occurs comes in the final pages of The Symbolism of Evil,22 
where Ricoeur outlines its three stages.  The first of these is a phenome-
nological stage, occasioned by the Husserlian epochē, which attempts to 
understand the relation of symbols to one another.  At this stage, then, 
truth is a matter of simple coherence among the symbols themselves. 
(SE, 353)  Still, one cannot remain at this stage, since one must ask the 
more robust question of truth: “What do I make of these symbolic mean-
ings?” (SE, 354)  At the second stage, one enters the domain of the her-
meneutic circle, which is to be understood in an Augustinian sense as: 
“We must understand in order to believe, but we must believe in order to 
understand.” (SE, 351)  We have entered this stage when we admit that, 
as exegetes, we approach  symbols from a certain point of view, and so 
recognise that we believe before we understand these symbols.  Never-
                                                  
22 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, (tr.) Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Bea-
con Press, 1967). Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as SE. 
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theless, this circle does not become a properly philosophic circle until it 
is transformed by a wager. (SE, 355)  The philosopher, unlike the exe-
gete, cannot remain at the level of neutralised belief, but must return to 
the ontological domain of existence.  This final stage, Ricoeur argues, 
has the following three parts: 
 
[a] I wager that I shall have a better understanding of man and 
the bond between the being of man and the being of all beings if 
I follow the indication of symbolic thought.  That wager then 
becomes [b] the task of verifying my wager and saturating it, so 
to speak, with intelligibility.  In return, the task [c] transforms 
my wager: in betting on the significance of the symbolic world, I 
bet at the same time that my wager will be restored to me in the 
power of reflection, in the element of coherent discourse. (SE, 
355) 
 
The components of philosophical hermeneutics, then, correspond quite 
closely to Badiou’s own account of wager, intervention and transforma-
tion.  We have thus established the first lemma: that philosophical her-
meneutics cannot be sustained without a wager, verification and trans-
formation. 
 
5.2 
 
Before turning to the second lemma, we would like to take a moment to 
clarify two points that are likely to cause some confusion.  The first con-
cerns a critical difference between the two schemas: Ricoeur’s account as 
presented so far remains confined to a trajectory of self-recovery, and 
does not appear to be directed, as are Badiou’s truth procedures, to 
worldly transformation.  Does not this difference show that something is 
fundamentally lacking in Ricoeur’s account? 
 Let us respond carefully.  For Ricoeur, self-recovery only ever 
occurs in the context of the world, so the two are not actually distinct.  
This point is strengthened in Ricoeur’s later turn to the model of the text.  
Recall that a “text,” for Ricoeur, “is any discourse fixed by writing.” 
(TA, 106)  This fixing, while sheltering the event of discourse from de-
struction, fundamentally transforms the meaning of the discourse.  The 
reason for this is clear enough: textual meaning and the intention of the 
 
 
 
174  Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy 
 
author are irrevocably sundered by the distanciation engendered by the 
fixing.   This distanciation (Verfremdung), however, has a positive rather 
than a negative significance, as the decontextualisation of the world in 
the event of discourse allows for the recontextualisation of the text by the 
act of reading. (TA, 83)  For the sake of methodological continuity, we 
note that this account of the text extends Ricoeur’s early account of wa-
gers, verification and transformation.  In his early work, one undertakes 
such a hermeneutic inquiry only in response to symbolic events of mean-
ing; in his later work, Ricoeur extends the domain of response to seman-
tic innovations such as one finds in metaphor, text, narrative, action, 
even recognition.23 
 How does this textual model help in addressing the discrepancy 
between self and wordly transformation?  First, the activity of reading, so 
understood, introduces a moment of self-reflexivity, which opens the 
space for ideological critique. (TA, 297)  Next, it enables Ricoeur to ad-
dress the Anglo-American debates about action theory.  The text can 
serve as a model for meaningful action, and so allows Ricoeur to address 
ethical and political transformation.  Thus, to recover myself means that I 
must recover the Other as well—this is, of course, the major thesis of 
Oneself as Another.  One cannot live with the Other save through just in-
stitutions, so that, while the project appears introspective, it is not.  The 
difference, in fact, suggests that while Badiou’s truth procedures clearly 
lack any regulative critical moment, Ricoeur’s require such a moment.  
While ethics, for Badiou, is simply the account of those empty personal 
virtues that enable one to continue in a truth procedure, Ricoeur’s, by 
contrast, is necessarily substantive and normative. 
                                                  
23 One might wonder what exactly is the difference between Ricoeur’s and 
Badiou’s account of the event, now that it has been shown that hermeneutic in-
quiry, for Ricoeur, takes place in response to events of meaning.  Though the 
question deserves its own piece, the following may be taken as an indication.  
First, Ricoeur, more like Gilles Deleuze and less like Badiou in Being and 
Event, holds that events may be mundane affairs.  Second, Ricoeur does hold 
that there are radical events—that is, those that totally rupture with the estab-
lished sense of a situation—but he approaches this point primarily through lan-
guage rather than mathematical ontology.  Third, Ricoeur does hold that these 
events of meaning have ontological significance, but that the ontology can only 
be gauged provisionally (as one finds in the last chapters, for example, of The 
Rule of Metaphor and Oneself as Another). 
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 Our response to this difference, then, is to stand the objection on 
its head.  It is Badiou who fails, even after Logics of Worlds, to direct his 
truth procedures to the world in a robust sense, and so remains in a sol-
ipsistic subjectivity of evental intervention, while it is Ricoeur alone who 
recognises the richness of human relations and political institutions.  To 
meet this objection, Badiou must undertake more work to show how ex-
isting institutions and relations (and not only revolution) could constitute 
genuine political activity.24 
 The second point of confusion concerns what appears to be Ri-
coeur’s residual finitism.  In Conditions, Badiou argues that a primary 
indication of the finitism of hermeutics is its inability to break with the 
correlation of truth and meaning as follows:   
 
I propose to call “religion” everything that presupposes that there 
is a continuity between truths and the circulation of meaning.  
We can thus say: philosophy is what, against every hermeneu-
tics, against the religious law of meaning, assembles compossi-
ble truths on the basis of the void. (C, 24) 
 
Unfortunately, this and similar statements can be a bit misleading.  To 
simplify matters, let us consider only Being and Event.  There, forcing 
occurs only after the naming of some event that is indiscernible within 
the situation.  The meaning is accessible as a second-order referent only 
to those who are faithful to the generic procedure, and the statement is 
senseless to those who do not recognise it. (BE, 397)  Meaning and truth 
are thus closely related for Badiou’s own account.  What he has in mind 
with his criticism, however, is that hermeneutics cannot break with the 
meaning of the situation, even if it aims to interpret or explicate it.  Can 
we show that hermeneutics does allow for a radical break? 
                                                  
24 In part five of the preface to Logics of Worlds, it is true that Badiou does 
elaborate an example of the state revolutionary in the case of Mao Tse-tung.  
But this example only makes our point, first, because he there explicitly links 
political intervention to terror and the need to avoid respecting human rights, 
and second, because even in this case Badiou only conceives of politics as revo-
lutionary.  There just is no room to affirm anything good about existing political 
institutions as part of a political practice. 
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 While this point may hold for Heidegger, what is striking about 
Badiou’s account of meaning in relation to generic procedures is how 
close it is to Ricoeur’s own account of the meaning of metaphors and the 
world of texts.  Famously, for Ricoeur, metaphor captures a primary way 
that radical semantic innovation occurs.  In a live metaphor, a second-
order reference emerges from the non-sense that constitutes a literal in-
terpretation of the statement.25 Furthermore, metaphors not only radically 
break with the meanings available in the situation, they redescribe what 
is (qui est) or being itself. (RM, 292)  As if this were not enough to meet 
the objection, Ricoeur goes on to extend this account to narrative and the 
narrative self.26  One can thus legitimately claim that living with others in 
and through just political institutions is not only a task, but one that re-
quires that one engage in a process of political truth.  Even more gener-
ally, the threefold process of hermeneutics outlined above is thus best 
understood as nothing short of Ricoeur’s account of Truth (vérité).  Ri-
coeur’s hermeneutics, then, lacks none of the ability to subtract truths 
from a situation that Badiou’s account has. 
 
5.3 
 
Turning to the second lemma of our argument, we concede to Meillas-
soux the point that there is a correlationism at work in hermeneutics.  
But, it is not a correlation of thought and being.  For Heidegger, the her-
meneutic circle becomes a living circle rather than a vicious circle be-
cause he transposes the epistemological question onto the plane of fun-
damental ontology.  In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur, by contrast, sug-
gests that hermeneutics can make its circle stimulating by affirming the 
status of inquiry itself.  To explicate this account, Ricoeur does not turn 
                                                  
25 Paul Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language, (tr.) 
Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello (New York: Rout-
ledge Classics, 2003), 261. Hereafter referred to parenthetically in the text as 
RM. 
26 Here again, Ricoeur is pellucid.  In the preface to the first volume of Time and 
Narrative, (tr.) Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1984) , he writes: “Although metaphor has traditionally be-
longed to the theory of ‘tropes’ (or figures of discourse) and narrative to the the-
ory of literary ‘genres,’ the meaning-effects produced by each of them belong to 
the same basic phenomenon of semantic innovation.” See p. ix. 
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to Heidegger’s formulation of phenomenological inquiry in section 2 of 
Being and Time, as  this would be to take the short road.  Instead, he 
turns to Rudolf Bultmann’s Glauben und Verstehen in order to specify 
the character of the belief that precedes understanding.  Quoting Bult-
mann, Ricoeur writes, “All understanding, like all interpretation, 
is...continually oriented by the manner of posing the question and by 
what it aims at [by its Woraufhin].  Consequently, it is never without pre-
suppositions; that is to say, it is always directed by a prior understanding 
of the thing about which it interrogates the text.” (SE, 351)  Bultmann’s 
insistence on “this coincidence with the Woraufhin, with the thing about 
which the text speaks,” Ricoeur notes, ensures that Dilthey’s romantic 
aim of coincidence between exegete and genius cannot be taken up. (SE, 
351)  At the same time, however, it also ensures that the hermeneutic cir-
cle can only be stimulating through inquiry. 
 Ricoeur’s transformation of the hermeneutic circle thus estab-
lishes an alternative correlation: the correlation between the question and 
that questioned.  In order for this new correlation to achieve the status of 
an infinite recovery, a supposition underwrites it: there is nothing which 
we cannot at least question.  In response to Meillassoux, then, we note 
that there is a crucial difference between a correlation that affirms a 
(pre)understanding of  P and a thought that asks a question about P.  
While the former does affirm a positive unity as given, the latter posits 
such a unity only as a task—one that is to be recovered only through the 
threefold process described above, and which closely parallels Badiou’s 
own account.  The unity gained remains revisable, but Ricoeur does not 
hold that we cannot access the absolute, only that we cannot access it to-
tally.  Our methods of dating might change, such that the date of some 
prehistoric fossil is revised.  Perhaps we will develop some radically cir-
cular or at least non-linear notion of time such that the significance of 
statements concerning the prior existence of a fossil might change.  Per-
haps there will be developments in geological understanding such that 
what we now understand as a fossil changes.  Any of these possibilities, 
and others, might occur, and it is for this reason that the hermeneut af-
firms the revisability of such scientific statements, though she also af-
firms the superiority of current explanations over  others (such as Chris-
tian fundamentalism).  Since this revisability is only what Meillassoux 
himself holds, we hold that Ricoeur’s reformulation of hermeneutics 
meets the ancestral problem. (AF, 9) 
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6. 
 
It is hoped that the above argument shows at least that the central criti-
cisms of hermeneutics, and specifically of its commitment to finitude, do 
not hold.  What has been outlined is the way in which Ricoeur’s herme-
neutics is an infinite hermeneutics.  His appropriation of Jean Nabert al-
lows him to reformulate the hermeneutic circle as one that proceeds only 
through a subtractive process of wagering on an undecidable meaning, 
intervening in the world, and then verifying or forcing the result.  Since 
this activity is undertaken not only in reading, but through living one’s 
life with and for others in just institutions, it requires ethical breaks with 
established meanings and norms for action aimed at just ends.  Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics, then, is explicitly positive, and hardly succumbs to the ni-
hilist position that supposes that the peril of thought consists in bringing 
one to the verge or threshold of undecidability.  It thus qualifies as infi-
nite in Badiou’s sense of the term.  Turning to Meillassoux, we agree that 
there is a fundamental correlation at work in hermeneutics, but because it 
is that of the process of inquiry rather than that of being and thought or 
understanding, it is no more problematic than Meillassoux’s own adher-
ence to the revisability of scientific results.  We can access the absolute, 
if not totally or with incorrigible certainty, though this corrigibility is 
only granted because we are always open to forms of epistemic advance, 
which would have to explain the specified phenomena at least as well as 
their predecessors.  Thus, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics breaks with the motif 
of correlationism and qualifies as infinite in Meillassoux’s sense.  This 
much, then, constitutes a response to the criticism by Badiou and Meil-
lassoux. 
 We should like to draw these reflections to a close by outlining 
why this response remains only provisional for at least three reasons.  
First, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics remains largely tied to the literary model 
of the text.  While he does undertake to expand it in discussion with 
Jean-Pierre Changeaux, and Ihde expands it to science, this model has 
not yet reached a sufficiently broad scope to encompass the status of all 
sciences.  In particular, no hermeneutics of mathematics or logic has yet 
been provided, and the work on science that has been done will likely 
need to be deepened.  Still, we recall that what has been done retains the 
principal advantage of avoiding the reductionism entailed by Badiou’s 
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and Meillassoux’s projects.  Second, we have here only broached the dif-
ficult problem of the subject.   
 It is likely that Badiou and Meillassoux would counter the above 
response by suggesting that Ricoeur’s narrative subject, finally, must be 
the unity that defines the correlation.  This response is clearly, for anyone 
familiar with Ricoeur’s work, simply inaccurate, as the subjectivity re-
covered there is nothing but a relation that emerges out of the ruins of 
the Cartesian cogito.  Nevertheless, it is granted that there are numerous 
details that remain to be worked out.  In particular, one would want to 
know the relation of the narrative subject to the process of inquiry.  Fi-
nally, Badiou has provided a detailed account of the four truth proce-
dures: art, science, love and politics.  While Ricoeur’s account of inquiry 
is similar to this process, the specificity of these procedures is not present 
in his oeuvre.  Here, however, we believe that the most valuable work 
remains to be accomplished, for Ricoeur’s account of inquiry retains a 
critical moment that is totally impossible for Badiou.  This is why the lat-
ter has no ability, especially in the case of politics, to specify why vio-
lence, even on a large scale, is wrong.  His sometimes troubling support 
of Maoism follows directly from this denial of human rights and his in-
ability to recognise the positive features of established political institu-
tions.  Ricoeur’s critical moment in hermeneutic inquiry, by contrast, en-
ables him to specify the possibility of human rights and the utility of ex-
isting political institutions.  He provides the grounds, then, for a positive 
politics without the denial of basic human rights, and without the need to 
transform all genuine political action into (violent) revolution.  If the 
tasks remain large for hermeneutics, at least our future possibilities do, as 
well. 
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